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I. INTRODUCTION 
The phrase “excusable neglect” has special meaning in the law. For 
example, a party that misses a deadline for filing a pleading may still be 
able to file the pleading after the time for doing so has expired if it can 
demonstrate that its failure was the product of excusable neglect.1 A 
party may be required to demonstrate excusable neglect to avoid 
sanctions for untimely action,2 or to obtain relief from a final judgment 
or order.3 Perhaps most importantly, a party may have to show excusable 
neglect if it hopes to pursue an appeal after failing to timely file a notice 
of appeal. In federal courts, a party that wants to take an appeal from a 
final judgment or order in a district court must under Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(a) file a notice of appeal with the district clerk 
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 1 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b). 
 2 See, e.g., Matajek v. Skowronska, 893 So. 2d 700, 701-02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005) (finding no excusable neglect and therefore sanctioning lawyer for late filing of 
mediation questionnaire). 
 3 See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1); see, e.g., Scoggins v. Jacobs, 610 S.E.2d 428, 432 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that party’s failure to retain counsel was not excusable 
neglect warranting relief from judgment); Williams Corner Investors, L.L.C. v. Areawide 
Cellular, L.L.C., 676 N.W.2d 168, 172-74 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (refusing under 
Wisconsin law to set aside default judgment based on excusable neglect). 
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within thirty days after that judgment or order is entered, or within sixty 
days if the United States or its agency or officer is a party.4 A district 
court may under Rule 4(a)(5)(A) extend the time to file a notice of 
appeal if (1) a party so moves within the original appeal period or no 
later than thirty days thereafter; and (2) regardless of whether its motion 
is filed before or during the time prescribed in Rule 4(a) expires, the 
party “shows excusable neglect or good cause.”5 Some states have 
adopted rules of appellate procedure modeled on the federal rules, 
likewise adopting the excusable neglect and good cause standards for 
allowing late appeals.6 
In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, decided Pincay v. Andrews,7 referred to here as Pincay II. 
In Pincay II, the court affirmed a district court’s finding of excusable 
neglect—and thus its decision to extend a party’s time to appeal—when 
a lawyer left to a paralegal serving as his law firm’s calendaring clerk 
responsibility for calendaring appellate deadlines and the paralegal 
calendared the wrong date.8 The decision in Pincay II is noteworthy 
because courts have traditionally rejected the notion that a lawyer’s 
delegation of tasks to another lawyer or to a non-lawyer employee 
amounts to excusable neglect if the other lawyer or staff member errs.9 
Furthermore, the real problem in Pincay II was that the paralegal charged 
with calendaring the appellate deadlines inexplicably misread the clear 
language of Rule 4(a)(1),10 and courts have overwhelmingly held that a 
lawyer’s failure to understand the plain language of federal rules cannot 
                                                                                                             
 4 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1). 
 5 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(A). 
 6 See, e.g., Enos v. Pac. Transfer & Warehouse, Inc., 910 P.2d 116 (Haw. 1996). 
 7 389 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Pincay II). 
 8 Id. at 854-60. 
 9 See, e.g., Cleek Aviation v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 766, 767, 770 (1990) (holding 
that there was no excusable neglect where secretary incorrectly addressed envelope), 
superseded by rule as stated in Cygnus Corp. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 646 (2005); 
Borio v. Coastal Marine Constr. Co., 881 F.2d 1053, 1056 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding “that 
it is not excusable neglect when counsel fails to file a timely appeal because his or her 
secretary misfiles the notice of appeal in her own files”), abrogated by Advanced 
Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 77 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1996); Airline Pilots v. Exec. 
Airlines, Inc., 569 F.2d 1174, 1175 (1st Cir. 1978) (finding that secretary’s failure to 
diary the correct date did not constitute excusable neglect), abrogation recognized by 
Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 12-N v. Quebecor Printing Providence, Inc., 270 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001); Home Ins. Co. v. Law Offices of Jonathan DeYoung, P.C., 156 F. 
Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding no excusable neglect where lawyer directed a 
newly-hired part time assistant to calendar appellate deadline); United States v. Virginia, 
508 F. Supp. 187, 190-93 (E.D. Va. 1981) (finding no excusable neglect where attorney 
dictated instructions concerning notice of appeal but lawyer working with him never 
followed up with respect to appeal and tape was lost). 
 10 See Pincay II, 389 F.3d at 855. 
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constitute excusable neglect.11 A different result should not obtain simply 
because a lawyer delegates the task of reading and applying a rule to 
non-lawyer support staff. 
The decision in Pincay II is potentially significant from a 
professional liability perspective, because legal malpractice specialists 
urge law firms to create centralized work control systems in which non-
lawyer staff record and monitor deadlines.12 It is also significant as a 
practical matter because the delegation of tasks such as calendaring 
deadlines to non-lawyer staff is commonplace today, at least at large and 
sophisticated law firms. In any event, Pincay II appears to dramatically 
relax the excusable neglect standard and to reward lawyers for abdicating 
their professional responsibilities. This article explains why Pincay II 
was wrongly decided and discusses some implications for lawyers.    
II. EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
Rule 4(a)(5) allows a district court to extend the deadline for filing 
a notice of appeal if the motion for extension is made within the original 
appeal period or within thirty days thereafter, and the moving party 
“shows excusable neglect or good cause.”13 The “excusable neglect” and 
“good cause” standards in Rule 4(a)(5) are separate and distinct;14 they 
“are not interchangeable.”15 Although some courts have reasoned that 
good cause applies only to requests for extensions made before the 
original period for filing a notice of appeal expires, while excusable 
neglect applies to requests made afterwards,16 that is plainly wrong.17 
                                                                                                             
 11 See, e.g., Kaubisch v. Weber, 408 F.3d 540, 543 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Torres, 372 F.3d 1159, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 2004); Graphic Commc’ns, 270 F.3d at 7-8; 
Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F.3d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1997); Prizevoits 
v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 76 F.3d 132, 133-34 (7th Cir. 1996); Weinstock v. Cleary, Gottlieb, 
Steen & Hamilton, 16 F.3d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 12 See 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 2.23, at 
204 (5th ed. 2000). 
 13 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(A). 
 14 See Virella-Nieves v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 53 F.3d 451, 453 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(observing when discussing earlier case that “the two standards occupy distinct spheres”). 
 15 20 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 304App.07[2], at 
304App.-34 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2004) [hereinafter MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE]. 
 16 See, e.g., Lorenzen v. Employees Ret. Plan of the Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 
F.2d 228, 231 (7th Cir. 1990); Parke-Chapley Constr. Co. v. Cherrington, 865 F.2d 907, 
909-10 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing cases from several federal judicial circuits); Seyler v. 
Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1355 n.3 (D. Kan. 2000) (citing 
cases). 
 17 See Bishop v. Corsentino, 371 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir. 2004); Virella-Nieves, 
53 F.3d at 453-54; see also Enos v. Pac. Transfer & Warehouse, Inc., 910 P.2d 116, 120-
23 (Haw. 1996) (discussing HAW. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5), which is modeled on FED. R. APP. P. 
4(a)(5)). 
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The applicability of one standard or the other turns not on when a party 
moves for an extension of time, but on whether the need for an extension 
is the movant’s fault.18 Where the movant bears no fault related to the 
requested extension, as where the extension is necessitated by events 
beyond the movant’s control, the good cause standard applies.19 Where 
there is fault, excusable neglect is the measure. As a leading treatise 
explains: 
The excusable neglect standard applies in situations in which 
there is fault; in such situations, the need for an extension is 
usually occasioned by something within the control of the 
movant. The good cause standard applies in situations in which 
there is no fault—excusable or otherwise. In such situations, the 
need for an extension is usually occasioned by something that is 
not within the control of the movant. 
Thus, the good cause standard can apply to motions brought 
during the 30 days following the expiration of the original 
deadline. If, for example, the Postal Service fails to deliver a 
notice of appeal, a movant might have good cause to seek a post-
expiration extension. It may be unfair to make such a movant 
prove that its “neglect” was excusable, given that the movant 
may not have been neglectful at all. Similarly, the excusable 
neglect standard can apply to motions brought prior to the 
expiration of the original deadline. For example, a movant may 
bring a pre-expiration motion for an extension of time when an 
error committed by the movant makes it unlikely that the movant 
will be able to meet the original deadline.20 
Good cause is a relatively easy standard to apply and it is rarely 
invoked.21 Disputes involving Rule 4(a)(5) mostly turn on the meaning of 
excusable neglect. Courts long held neglect to be excusable “only in 
unique or extraordinary circumstances.”22 Then, in 1993, the Supreme 
Court endorsed a more generous interpretation of excusable neglect in 
                                                                                                             
 18 Bishop, 371 F.3d at 1207 (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5) advisory committee’s 
note (2002 Amendments)); Webster v. Pacesetter, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 
2003) (same). 
 19 Mirpuri v. ACT Mfg., Inc., 212 F.3d 624, 630 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 20 20 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 15, § 304App.07[2], at 304App.-34. 
 21 See Mirpuri, 212 F.3d at 630 (noting that good cause standard applies to a “narrow 
class of cases in which a traditional ‘excusable neglect’ analysis would be inapposite”). 
 22 Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 12-N v. Quebecor Printing Providence, Inc., 
270 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2001) (discussing First Circuit precedent and quoting Pontarelli v. 
Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 111 (1st Cir. 1991)). 
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Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. 
Partnership.23 
In Pioneer, the Court was called upon to decide whether an 
attorney’s inadvertent failure to timely file a bankruptcy proof of claim 
could constitute excusable neglect within the meaning of Bankruptcy 
Rule 9006(b)(1).24 The Court concluded that the determination of 
whether a party’s neglect is excusable “is at bottom an equitable one, 
taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s 
omission.”25 Where appropriate, federal courts may “accept late filings 
caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by 
intervening circumstances beyond the party’s control.”26 In determining 
whether to allow late filings, circumstances that courts should consider 
include “the danger of prejudice to the [non-moving party], the length of 
the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for 
the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the 
movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.”27 
Although decided in the bankruptcy context, the Pioneer approach 
logically applies to controversies under other rules where excusable 
neglect is the standard for granting extensions of time,28 such as Rule 
4(a)(5).29 Thus, in deciding whether to allow a party to file a notice of 
                                                                                                             
 23 507 U.S. 380 (1993). 
 24 Id. at 382-83. Rule 9006(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 
provides: 
when an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period 
by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court, the court 
for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion 
or notice order the period enlarged if the request therefor is made before the 
expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous 
order or (2) on motion made after the expiration of the specified period 
permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable 
neglect. 
 25 Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. 
 26 Id. at 388. 
 27 Id. at 395. 
 28 See, e.g., George Harms Constr. Co. v. Chao, 371 F.3d 156, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(applying the Pioneer four-factor analysis in the FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) context); In re 
Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 327 F.3d 1207, 1209-10 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing 
Rules 60(b) and 6(b) with respect to class action opt-outs); Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
231 F.3d 1220, 1223-25 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Pioneer in Rule 60(b) context). 
 29 See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 401 F.3d 143, 153-54 (3d Cir. 2005); Halicki v. La. Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 
465, 469 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998) (“In extending Pioneer to Rule 4(a)(5), we follow each of 
our sister circuits to have addressed the issue.”); City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas 
Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1046 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Because the Court’s analysis [in Pioneer] of 
what constitutes ‘excusable neglect’ in the bankruptcy context rested on the plain 
meaning of the terms, there is no reason that the meaning would be different in the 
context of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5).”). 
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appeal out of time, a court should consider (1) the danger of prejudice to 
the non-moving party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact 
on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the 
movant acted in good faith.30 These four factors do not bear equal 
weight; the third factor—the reason for the delay—clearly is the most 
important.31 This makes sense, because the first, second and fourth 
factors easily favor the movant in most cases; non-moving parties are 
seldom prejudiced because delays in this context are usually short, and 
delays attributable to bad faith are exceedingly rare.32 
When it comes to the reason for the delay, it is important to 
understand that even under the equitable and flexible Pioneer standard 
not any excuse will suffice.33 The moving party still must offer a 
“satisfactory explanation” for its tardiness.34 Courts often hold neglect to 
be inexcusable.35 In making excusable neglect determinations, a party’s 
fault or that of its attorneys is the most important consideration.36 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S TRANSFORMATION OF EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
In the Ninth Circuit, as elsewhere, a lawyer’s mistake of law, such 
as misinterpreting a clear rule, generally does not constitute excusable 
neglect.37 Accordingly, the court’s en banc decision in the case we will 
call Pincay II,38 in which the court reheard a panel decision in the case 
known as Pincay I,39 surprised many trial and appellate lawyers. 
A. The Pincay Decisions 
The Pincay decisions arose out of a RICO action. Pincay obtained a 
judgment against Andrews in a federal district court on July 3, 2002, and, 
                                                                                                             
 30 See Gibbons v. United States, 317 F.3d 852, 854 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Pioneer). 
 31 Id. (quoting Lowry v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 211 F.3d 457, 463 (8th Cir. 
2003)); Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 12-N v. Quebecor Printing Providence, 
Inc., 270 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2001); City of Chanute, 31 F.3d at 1046. 
 32 See Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 333 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 
and citing Lowry, 211 F.3d at 463). 
 33 See Graphic Commc’ns, 270 F.3d at 5. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See, e.g., Gibbons, 317 F.3d at 855 (affirming district court’s conclusion that 
neglect was not excusable); Prizevoits v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 76 F.3d 132, 134 (7th Cir. 
1996) (“If there was ‘excusable’ neglect here, we have difficulty imagining a case of 
inexcusable neglect.”). 
 36 City of Chanute, 31 F.3d at 1046. 
 37 See, e.g., Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(concluding that district court abused its discretion by finding that lawyer’s mistaken 
reliance upon FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e) constituted excusable neglect). 
 38 Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Pincay II). 
 39 Pincay v. Andrews, 351 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pincay I), reh’g granted, 367 
F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2004), on reh’g, 389 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Pincay II). 
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because the government was not a party to the action, Andrews’s notice 
of appeal was due thirty days later.40 On July 10, the paralegal 
functioning as calendaring clerk at Boies, Schiller & Flexner (“Boies”),41 
the sophisticated law firm representing Andrews, faxed a copy of the 
judgment to the lead lawyer, who was out of the office at the time.42 The 
lawyer and the paralegal than exchanged e-mails and, in that exchange, 
the paralegal told the lawyer that Andrews had sixty days to take an 
appeal under Rule 4, making the notice of appeal due on September 3 in 
light of the Labor Day holiday.43 The lawyer accepted this, nonetheless 
instructing the paralegal to calendar the due date a few days ahead of 
Labor Day.44 The lawyer never read Rule 4 himself, nor did he otherwise 
check the paralegal’s time calculation.45 Of course, Andrews had only 
thirty days in which to file a notice of appeal, not sixty.46 
The lawyer learned of trouble with Andrews’s appeal on August 22 
when Pincay filed a notice in Andrews’s parallel bankruptcy proceeding 
indicating that the judgment was final and that the appeal period had 
expired.47 On August 25, Andrews moved to extend the time in which to 
appeal from the July 3 judgment.48 In that motion, Andrews asserted that 
Boies relied on the calendar clerk to calculate appellate deadlines, that 
the clerk made a mistake, and that this mistake amounted to excusable 
neglect.49 The district court applied Pioneer and concluded that 
Andrews’s time in which to appeal should be extended because 
“‘attorney mistakes made in good faith with no prejudice to the other 
party are excusable neglect.’”50 Pincay appealed.51 
In Pincay I, the court stated that “Andrews’s counsel did not show 
good cause for his failure to file” a timely notice of appeal, nor could he 
establish excusable neglect.52 Rather: 
What counsel did was to delegate a professional task to a 
nonprofessional to perform. Knowledge of the law is a lawyer’s 
                                                                                                             
 40 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1). 
 41 The fact that Boies, Schiller & Flexner represented Andrews is not mentioned in 
the opinion. See Charles Delafuente, Not Late, Just Mistaken, 3 No. 47 A.B.A. J. E-
Report 4 (Dec. 3, 2004) (identifying the law firm). 
 42 Pincay I, 351 F.3d at 948-49. 
 43 Id. at 949. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See id. at 951. 
 46 See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). 
 47 Pincay I, 351 F.3d at 949. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 954 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (quoting the district court’s order). 
 51 Id. at 949. 
 52 Id. 
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stock in trade. Bureaucratization of the law such that the lawyer 
can turn over to nonlawyers the lawyer’s knowledge of the law is 
not acceptable for our profession.53 
On appeal, as he did in the district court, Andrews focused on the 
calendaring clerk’s mistake, which he characterized as “an unexplained 
aberration by a man experienced in court procedures.”54 The Pincay I 
court thought this focus wrong, stating: 
The focus must be on the lawyer. Paralegals and other 
nonlawyers perform services in firms; many of the services 
involve knowledge of the law and were once performed by junior 
lawyers. The economy of such delegation is evident. But 
delegation cannot be made of responsibility for personal 
knowledge. When the lawyer delegates, he retains responsibility 
for knowing the law.55 
The lawyer’s admitted ignorance of the law, supposedly justifying 
his reliance on the clerk, did not help Andrews. 
Not knowing the law governing one’s practice is different from 
mere neglect, and it cannot be classified as excusable neglect. No 
axiom is more familiar than, “Ignorance of the law is no excuse.” 
This ordinary rule is not a per se rule, but it ordinarily applies to 
those whose profession is the law. 
Nowhere in the proceedings in this case does the lawyer state that 
he had read the federal rules governing appeals. Nowhere does he 
state that he misremembered them. All that the lawyer states is 
that he relied on his clerk. A lawyer’s obligation to know relevant 
law cannot be delegated in this way to a nonlawyer. A solo 
practitioner would not even be in a position to attempt this kind 
of delegation. Membership in a large firm does not give the 
lawyer leave to delegate to others the basic rules of the lawyer’s 
practice.56 
The Pincay I court concluded that under Pioneer, ignorance of clear 
rules or mistakes in construing them do not ordinarily constitute 
excusable neglect.57 In this case, the lawyer’s ignorance of the rules was 
compounded by his delegation of his need to know the rules to a non-
                                                                                                             
 53 Id. at 950. 
 54 Id. at 951. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 951-52 (discussing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 
507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993)). 
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lawyer whose actions he was unwilling to accept responsibility for.58 
Accordingly, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in 
extending Andrews’s time to appeal.59 
Judge Kleinfeld dissented, asserting that following Pioneer 
“[i]gnorance of the law and negligent delegation can indeed be classified 
as excusable neglect.”60 Furthermore, he reasoned, the majority had 
failed to afford the district court the deference it was due under the abuse 
of discretion standard of review.61 Apparently spurred by the dissent, the 
court as a whole voted to rehear the case en banc “to consider whether 
the creation of a per se rule against delegation to paralegals, or indeed 
any per se rule involving missed filing deadlines,” is consistent with 
Pioneer.62 Thus came Pincay II. 
The Pincay II court noted that the calendaring clerk’s error was 
inexplicable. After all, the clerk calendared Andrews’s deadline to appeal 
for sixty days out under Rule 4(a)(1)(B), as though the government were 
a party, even though the case had been going on for fifteen years, 
everyone should have known that the government was not a party, and 
any lawyer or paralegal should have been able to read the applicable rule 
correctly.63 The clerk’s misreading of Rule 4(a) was a critical error that 
the district court easily could have concluded was inexcusable, thus 
ending the litigation.64 Even so, the lawyer’s delegation to the clerk the 
task of ascertaining the deadline for appealing was not “per se 
inexcusable neglect.”65 As the court explained: 
In the modern world of legal practice, the delegation of repetitive 
legal tasks to paralegals has become a necessary fixture. Such 
delegation has become an integral part of the struggle to keep 
down the costs of legal representation. Moreover, the delegation 
of such tasks to specialized, well-educated non-lawyers may well 
ensure greater accuracy in meeting deadlines than a practice of 
having each lawyer in a large law firm calculate each filing 
deadline anew. The task of keeping track of necessary deadlines 
will involve some delegation. The responsibility for the error 
falls on the attorney regardless of whether the error was made by 
an attorney or a paralegal. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 
5.5 cmt. 2 (2002) (“This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from 
                                                                                                             
 58 Id. at 952. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
 61 Id. at 955-56. 
 62 Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Pincay II). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 856. 
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employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating 
functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated 
work and retains responsibility for their work.”).66 
The larger question, the Pincay II court reasoned, was “whether the 
[clerk’s] misreading of the clear rule could . . . [be] considered excusable 
neglect.”67 The clerk’s misreading of the rule was an “egregious” 
mistake; the lawyer “undoubtedly” should have read the rule himself 
rather than relying on the clerk; and the clerk and the lawyer both were 
negligent as a result.68 But the fact that the clerk and the lawyer were 
both negligent was the starting point in the court’s excusable neglect 
analysis, not the end of it.69 The “real question” was whether the facts 
were such that the determination of excusable neglect was within the 
district court’s discretion.70 
In analyzing this issue, the court focused on the third Pioneer 
factor, the reason for the delay.71 Andrews characterized the reason for 
the delay as “the failure of a ‘carefully designed’ calendaring system 
operated by experienced paralegals that heretofore had worked 
flawlessly.”72 Pincay, on the other hand, focused on the “degree of 
carelessness” in the paralegal’s failure to read the appropriate 
subparagraph of Rule 4(a)(1).73 Noting the equitable nature of the 
inquiry, the court stated: 
We recognize that a lawyer’s failure to read an applicable rule is 
one of the least compelling excuses that can be offered; yet the 
nature of the contextual analysis and the balancing of the factors 
adopted in Pioneer counsel against the creation of any rigid rule. 
Rather, the decision whether to grant or deny an extension of 
time to file a notice of appeal should be entrusted to the 
discretion of the district court because the district court is in a 
better position than we are to evaluate factors such as whether the 
lawyer had otherwise been diligent, the propensity of the other 
side to capitalize on petty mistakes, the quality of the 
representation of the lawyers (in this litigation over its 15-year 
history), and the likelihood of injustice if the appeal was not 
allowed. Had the district court declined to permit the filing of the 
                                                                                                             
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 858. 
 69 Id. at 858-59. 
 70 Id. at 859. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
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notice, we would be hard pressed to find any rationale requiring 
us to reverse. 
Pioneer itself instructs courts to determine the issue of excusable 
neglect within the context of the particular case, a context with 
which the trial court is most familiar. Any rationale suggesting 
that misinterpretation of an unambiguous rule can never be 
excusable neglect is, in our view, contrary to that instruction.74 
The court reasoned that under Pioneer there was no room for a 
“rigid legal rule against late filings attributable to any particular type of 
negligence.”75 The Pincay II court held that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in granting Andrews’s motion for an extension of 
time in which to appeal and affirmed the district court’s order.76 
B. Pincay II and Beyond 
Although it is true that Pioneer counsels a flexible approach to 
determining excusable neglect and that the abuse of discretion standard 
by which district courts’ determinations of excusable neglect are 
measured is extremely deferential, Pincay II is a seriously flawed 
decision. For starters, this was not, as Andrews disingenuously 
contended, a case about “the failure of a ‘carefully designed’ calendaring 
system” that had previously “worked flawlessly.”77 The calendaring 
system was not carefully designed. An unsupervised paralegal read rules 
and calendared what he believed to be the correct deadlines. It is obvious 
that no one was responsible for double-checking his work. Absent human 
supervision, the “system” had no means of detecting errors. Furthermore, 
the system did not fail; it worked flawlessly. “The wrong date was 
calendared with meticulous efficiency and accuracy.”78 The problem was 
that the paralegal misread a crystal clear rule and calendared the wrong 
date, an error the court understandably described as “egregious.”79 
Indeed, if the neglect in this case was excusable, it is hard to imagine a 
case in which the neglect might be called inexcusable.80 Although it is 
easy to feel sorry for the paralegal, who doubtless was horrified by his 
error and remorseful for it, such feelings do not transform the paralegal’s 
                                                                                                             
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 860. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 859. 
 78 Id. at 862 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 79 Id. at 858. 
 80 See Prizevoits v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 76 F.3d 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Here the 
rule is crystal clear, the error egregious . . . . If there was ‘excusable’ neglect here, we 
have difficulty imagining a case of inexcusable neglect.”). 
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unaccountable lapse into excusable neglect.81 Even after Pioneer, courts 
generally hold that run-of-the-mill carelessness is not excusable 
neglect.82 
Even if it might be argued that a non-lawyer’s mere error in failing 
to record a deadline may amount to excusable neglect,83 this was not 
such a case. The problem was not that the calendaring clerk forgot to 
record the correct deadline, but that he misread a plain rule and thus 
recorded the wrong deadline. These are quite different errors. 
Nor was this a case about “delegation to paralegals,” as the court 
viewed it when voting for rehearing.84 This was a case about a lawyer’s 
abdication of responsibility. “Abdication” and “delegation” are not 
synonymous. 
Andrews’s lawyer received a copy of the underlying judgment on 
July 10, 2002, when the calendaring clerk faxed it to him; at that point, 
the judgment was seven days old.85 Because he was out of the office, the 
lawyer relied on the paralegal to tell him when the notice of appeal 
would be due.86 The lawyer did not question the paralegal’s time 
calculation or the basis for it, he did not ask the paralegal to e-mail the 
rule to him, nor did he ask the paralegal to confirm his reading of the 
appellate deadline with a lawyer in the office. When he returned to the 
office, the lawyer checked the calendar and saw that the deadline in 
Andrews’s case had been recorded.87 What the lawyer did not do—and 
what he should have done—was check to see that the correct deadline 
had been calendared.88 He never read Rule 4(a) to check the calendaring 
clerk’s judgment.89 As the Pincay I court explained: “Knowledge of the 
                                                                                                             
 81 See id. at 133 (explaining that “[a]n unaccountable lapse is not excusable 
neglect”). 
 82 See Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers., L.P., 109 F. App’x 670 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(involving FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) and lawyer who lost cassette tape allegedly 
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 83 See, e.g., Walter v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 181 F.3d 1198, 1202 
(11th Cir. 1999) (finding excusable neglect where lawyer’s former secretary failed to 
record deadline). 
 84 Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Pincay II). 
 85 Pincay v. Andrews, 351 F.3d 947, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pincay I), reh’g 
granted, 367 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 389 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) 
(Pincay II). 
 86 Id. at 949. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Pincay II, 389 F.3d at 858. 
 89 Pincay I, 351 F.3d at 951. 
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law is a lawyer’s stock in trade. Bureaucratization of the law such that 
the lawyer can turn over to nonlawyers the lawyer’s knowledge of the 
law is not acceptable for our profession.”90 
It is perhaps understandable that the lawyer, while out of the office, 
did not question the paralegal’s time calculation or ask the paralegal to 
check with another lawyer in the office to make sure that he was 
correctly reading the right rule. Although the paralegal’s report that 
Andrews had sixty days in which to take an appeal should have given the 
lawyer pause,91 the fact remains that he was out of the office and did not 
have access to a rulebook or some other means of quickly examining 
matters for himself. The lawyer’s failure to confirm the accuracy of such 
a critical date upon his return to the office, however, is another matter. It 
is difficult to imagine how the lawyer could not have thought to check 
the accuracy of the paralegal’s time calculation when he returned to the 
office. Again, the sixty-day period should have struck him as odd.92 As 
the dissent in Pincay II pointed out, “the 30-day rule for appeals in 
federal court is so well known among federal practitioners that, had the 
lawyer but thought about the rule, rather than relying entirely on the 
calendaring clerk’s representation, he surely would have realized that the 
60-day period [was] wrong.”93 Although a court understandably might 
excuse a novice lawyer’s lack of instinct or forgive the error of a lawyer 
who only rarely practices in the federal system,94 nothing suggests that 
Andrews’s lawyer was either young or a stranger to federal court. 
Nowhere did Andrews’s lawyer state that he read the Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, or Rule 4(a) in particular.95 Nowhere did he state 
that he knew the rules but simply recalled incorrectly the deadline for 
taking an appeal.96 Never did he claim that the rules confused him. Never 
did he assert that his travels prevented him from checking the paralegal’s 
time calculation.97 Never did he confess error but claim that his neglect 
                                                                                                             
 90 Id. at 950. 
 91 See United States v. Virginia, 508 F. Supp. 187, 188 (E.D. Va. 1981) (noting that 
the sixty days given to the government to appeal is an “extraordinary” time limit). 
 92 See Mark A. Drummond, Tardy Appeal Reinstated After Missed Deadline, LITIG. 
NEWS, May 2005, at 7 (quoting veteran appellate lawyer as saying “‘the 30-day deadline 
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 93 Pincay II, 389 F.3d at 863 (Kozinksi, J., dissenting). 
 94 See United States v. Brown, 133 F.3d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming district 
court’s finding of excusable neglect in case involving lawyer who was handling only one 
federal case, the rest of his practice being confined to Wisconsin state courts). 
 95 Pincay I, 351 F.3d at 951. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Even if the lawyer had made this argument it seems unlikely that the court would 
have been persuaded by it. See Dean v. Chicago Transit Auth., 118 F. App’x 993, 996 
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was still excusable when judged according to the Pioneer test. Unlike the 
lawyer in United States v. Brown,98 who, “[t]o his credit, . . . [did] not 
point[] a finger at others for his failing—he blame[d] his own 
misunderstanding of the rules,”99 Andrews’s lawyer declined 
responsibility at every turn, always blaming the paralegal for the error.100 
In common parlance, the lawyer threw the paralegal under the bus. That 
should have done him no good, of course, because a lawyer cannot 
escape professional responsibility by claiming that he delegated the 
subject task to his staff,101 a principle that the Pincay II court expressly 
recognized.102 
Even accepting the argument that the lawyer delegated 
responsibility to a paralegal who ran a carefully designed calendaring 
system rather than abdicating responsibility for knowing the law, that 
conduct is unrelated to the reason for the delay under the Pioneer test. 
Rather, it bears on the fourth Pioneer factor, that being “whether the 
movant acted in good faith.”103 But there was no allegation that 
Andrews’s lawyer had delayed filing a notice of appeal in bad faith and, 
absent that, Andrews’s good faith was inconsequential. “Extreme good 
faith has no exonerating power of its own; bad faith can sink an 
excusable neglect claim, and good faith is nothing but the absence of this 
negative.”104 
Although the Pincay II court repeatedly cited and referred to 
Pioneer to justify a flexible approach to determining excusable neglect 
and to explain its aversion to per se rules in this area, it is difficult to 
reconcile the decision in Pincay II with the Court’s statement in Pioneer 
that “inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the 
rules do not usually constitute ‘excusable neglect.’”105 In other words, 
inadvertence, ignorance of the rules and mistakes construing the rules 
constitute excusable neglect only in exceptional and rare 
                                                                                                             
(7th Cir. 2005) (“An attorney’s busy schedule, however, does not rise to the level of 
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 98 133 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 99 Id. at 997. 
 100 See Pincay I, 351 F.3d at 951; Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 
2004) (en banc) (Pincay II). 
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 102 Pincay II, 389 F.3d at 856. 
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circumstances,106 as where the rule or the way in which it is 
communicated to litigants are peculiar, or unusually ambiguous or 
vague.107 “Pioneer did not alter the . . . rule that mistakes of law 
[generally] do not constitute excusable neglect.”108 
Nothing about the facts or law in Pincay II was exceptional or rare. 
Rule 4(a) is clear. Any lawyer or paralegal should be able to read it 
correctly.109 What the Pincay II court was presented with was not a 
lawyer’s justifiable misunderstanding of an ambiguous rule, the peculiar 
or confusing application of one rule when coupled with another, or some 
complex or novel procedural posture, but garden variety inattention. That 
is not excusable neglect under Pioneer.110 The simple miscalculation of 
time deadlines is not excusable neglect after Pioneer,111 just as it was not 
before.112 There is good reason for this: 
Calculating time deadlines in the context of the demands of trial 
practice is routine and ordinary. . . . Indeed, miscalculating the 
time for filing is among the most ordinary types of neglect. . . . In 
the absence of unique underlying circumstances that impel a 
miscalculation, there is no way to verify a lawyer’s naked 
representation that he or she miscalculated time requirements.113             
In examining the reason for delay, some courts routinely consider 
as part of that inquiry whether the inadvertence “reflected professional 
incompetence,” such as ignorance of procedural rules, and whether the 
asserted inadvertence “reflects an easily manufactured excuse incapable 
of verification by the court.”114 By these measures, Andrews’s lawyer 
clearly did not demonstrate excusable neglect. The lawyer was ignorant 
of Rule 4(a) and his excuse for non-compliance with this clear rule was 
easily manufactured. 
                                                                                                             
 106 See Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 12-N v. Quebecor Printing Providence, 
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Any argument that the result in Pincay II was compelled by the 
deferential standard of review the court was required to apply must fail. 
Federal appellate courts regularly reverse district courts’ findings of 
excusable neglect based on abuse of discretion.115 Consistency and 
predictability in the law require as much. 
The court in Pincay II also created two practical problems. First, by 
affirming the district court’s finding of excusable neglect, the court 
essentially created two different excusable neglect standards: one for 
lawyers who practice in law firms or other organizations with ample 
support staff, and one for sole practitioners. If an experienced sole 
practitioner, who has handled previous appeals flawlessly and has timely 
filed everything in every appellate case she has ever handled, misreads 
Rule 4(a) and records the wrong date for filing a notice of appeal in her 
desk planner, which she scrupulously checks first thing every morning 
(the same planner in which she has always recorded all of her appellate 
deadlines), and therefore files the notice of appeal late, can she 
successfully claim that her client’s time to appeal should be extended 
because of excusable neglect? Has not her client been betrayed by “the 
failure of a ‘carefully designed’ calendaring system . . . that heretofore 
worked flawlessly”?116 Indeed, is not the sole practitioner’s calendaring 
system better than that employed by Boies, since in our hypothetical case 
it is actually the lawyer who reads and interprets the applicable 
procedural rules? The answer to the first question almost certainly is 
“no” even though the answer to the second and third questions are “yes.” 
The problems posed by that outcome are obvious.117 
Second, but more important, the Pincay II court created exactly 
what it wanted to avoid: a per se rule on excusable neglect. What is this 
Ninth Circuit per se rule? It is this: if a law firm maintains a formal 
calendaring system that depends solely on non-lawyer staff to calendar 
the correct dates and one of those staff members calendars the wrong 
date, such a failure constitutes excusable neglect so long as the firm 
                                                                                                             
 115 See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 372 F.3d 1159, 1162-64 (10th Cir. 2004); Lowry 
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 116 Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Pincay II). 
 117 Of course, a sole practitioner might solve this problem by delegating all 
calendaring responsibilities to her secretary. To the extent the Pincay II decision 
encourages such delegation it certainly does not promote responsible law practice. 
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satisfies the other Pioneer factors.118 Why is this a per se rule? Because, 
as Judge Kozinski noted in his dissent: 
Imagine what will happen the next time we get a case on 
materially indistinguishable facts, except that the district court 
found the delay inexcusable. Will it be just to tell the litigant that 
his case is lost because he happened to draw the wrong district 
judge?119 
It is not reasonable to argue against a per se rule because it is 
unlikely that the court will some day be called upon to decide a case with 
materially indistinguishable facts. Andrews’s lawyer practiced in a 
sophisticated law firm.120 Many large and sophisticated law firms employ 
centralized calendaring systems that depend on non-lawyer staff for their 
operation. The delegation of law-related tasks to non-lawyers has 
become an integral and routine part of modern law practice.121 The 
potential for error can be minimized, but it can never be eliminated. 
In short, the Ninth Circuit will see other cases arising out of 
substantially similar facts. The rules involved in these cases may be 
different—perhaps the court will be construing excusable neglect in 
connection with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6 or 60 rather than 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4—but the cases will come. 
Unfortunately, because those cases probably will turn on the reason for 
the delay rather than any of the other Pioneer factors, the court’s 
decision in Pincay II will have the undesirable effect of encouraging and 
rewarding careless lawyering.122 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAWYERS 
Lawyers should not rely on Pincay II. The case is wrongly decided. 
The Ninth Circuit is out of step with all of its sister courts on this issue. 
None of this means, of course, that lawyers and law firms cannot 
rely on centralized calendaring and docketing systems that are 
maintained by non-lawyer staff. Such systems are common and generally 
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are accurate and efficient. But, as the saying goes—and as Pincay I and 
Pincay II demonstrate—“garbage in, garbage out.” The best systems are 
valueless if the information that is calendared is inaccurate or incorrect. 
Errors are less likely where a lawyer reads the applicable rule and tells 
the calendaring clerk the date to record, rather than relying on a non-
lawyer staff member to read the rule and correctly calculate due dates. 
This is because lawyers are less likely than non-lawyers to misread 
procedural rules. “Studying and practicing law develops certain skills 
and habits of mind that . . . make lawyers more careful than non-lawyers 
about reading rules.”123 
At the very least, any system has to include some mechanism for 
checking the accuracy of the dates being calendared.124 This may be 
accomplished by lawyer supervision of non-lawyers within a central 
system, or it may be accomplished through parallel systems in which 
lawyers maintain their own calendars of case deadlines in addition to the 
firm’s centralized calendaring system.125 
Lawyers must assume that courts will treat the failure to read rules, 
failure to understand rules and failure to properly apply rules as 
inexcusable neglect. Few courts are likely to hold otherwise where a 
lawyer delegates responsibility for rules interpretations to non-lawyer 
staff. The bottom line is that lawyers must be responsible for reading 
appropriate rules and deciding upon appropriate deadlines, even if the 
task of calendaring such deadlines and ministerial acts designed to ensure 
compliance are delegated to non-lawyers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In federal courts, “the timely filing of a simple notice of appeal is 
the only step required to take an appeal.”126 The timely filing of a notice 
of appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Nonetheless, a party may 
file a notice of appeal out of time if it can demonstrate that its delay is 
the product of “excusable neglect.” Other situations, in both federal and 
state courts, likewise require litigants to demonstrate excusable neglect if 
they are to be allowed late filing. The phrase thus has special meaning in 
the law. 
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Traditionally, courts have declined to hold that lawyers’ mere 
inattention, or failure to understand or properly apply clear rules, 
constitute excusable neglect. Courts have also declined to find excusable 
neglect where lawyers delegate important tasks to secretaries and legal 
assistants and those non-lawyers then fail to perform the ostensibly 
simple tasks delegated to them. Courts do not allow lawyers to delegate 
away their professional responsibilities. 
In Pincay II, the Ninth Circuit upset all of these basic principles. 
The court affirmed a district court’s finding of excusable neglect where a 
lawyer abdicated his professional responsibilities and the paralegal to 
whom those responsibilities fell misread a crystal clear rule of appellate 
procedure. Although the court spoke of the need for lawyers to delegate 
tasks to non-lawyer support staff in the modern practice of law, in Pincay 
II the lawyer delegated nothing. What he did was abdicate responsibility. 
In doing so, he nearly sank his client’s case. 
Pincay II was wrongly decided. The court’s decision cannot be 
logically explained. It is no answer to say that the court simply applied a 
deferential abuse of discretion standard because appellate courts 
routinely reverse district courts’ excusable neglect findings under that 
standard. Lawyers must assume that courts will treat their failure to read 
rules, failure to understand rules, and failure to properly apply rules as 
inexcusable neglect, and practice accordingly. That is as it should be. 
